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COMMENTS
Quo Warranto in Pennsylvania: Old
Standards and New Developments
I. Introduction
The writ of quo warranto is not a routine legal procedure. Its
use is limited to trying a person's right to public or corporate office or
a corporation's right to exercise corporate powers. If prosecuted
successfully a judgment in quo warranto results in ouster of the
officeholder or revocation of the corporate franchise.
Despite the narrow scope of the action many quo warranto cases
have failed to reach the merits. Procedural technicalities are abun-
dant and the circumstances in which quo warranto will lie are diffi-
cult to pinpoint. This comment analyzes the writ's applications and
the prerequisites to its use. Important, recent decisions creating
equitable remedies in lieu of quo warranto are also reviewed. Al-
though these cases suggest that the technicalities implicit in the writ
are obsolete, equity has not yet supplanted quo warranto. Thus,
counsel challenging an officeholder's title must remain aware of the
problems a quo warranto action is certain to present.'
II. The Nature of the Remedy: Basics
A. Historical Considerations
The writ of quo warranto is one of 'the most ancient known to
the common law.' It was a high prerogative writ "in the nature of a
writ of right for the King against one who claims or usurps any office,
1. Quo warranto is included in the category of legal writs known as "extraor-
dinary remedies." The following quotation illustrates the problems attorneys face
when presented with what appears to be a quo warranto action:
An imaginary system cunningly planned for the evil purpose of thwart-
ing justice and maximizing fruitless litigation would copy the major features
of the extraordinary remedies. For the purpose of creating treacherous pro-
cedural snares and preventing or delaying the decision of cases on their
merits, such a scheme would insist upon a plurality of remedies, no remedy
would lie when another is available, the lines between the remedies would
be complex and shifting, the principal concepts confusing the boundaries of
each remedy would be undefined and undefinable, judicial opinions would
be filled with misleading generalities, and courts would studiously avoid dis-
cussing or even mentioning the lack of practical reasons behind the com-
plexities of the system.
K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TExT § 24.01, at 458 (3d ed. 1972).
2. Commonwealth ex rel. Parks v. Wherry, 302 Pa. 134, 152 A. 846 (1930);
74 C.J.S. Quo Warranto § 1 (1951).
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franchise or liberty, to inquire by what authority he supports his
claim, in order to determine the right."' 3 Medieval kings successfully
used the writ to curb the increasing power of feudal barons. The
theory that every franchise presumed a grant from the crown4 was
central in extending the writ to cases of forfeiture for abuse and
nonuse of grants from the king.'
Until the early eighteenth century6 the remedy was available
only on the suggestion of the attorney general to prevent encroach-
ments upon the royal prerogative.7 The Statute of Anne8 expanded
the writ's applicability, however, to cases of "intrusion into, or usur-
pation of corporate offices in corporate places."9  For the first time
the statute allowed an information on the relation of a private citizen
"as a means of investigating and determining the civil rights [to
office] between the parties."'"
B. The Writ in Pennsylvania
The availability of quo warranto in the United States generally is
regulated by constitutional or statutory provisions," although in some
3. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES -262. The earliest recorded case arose
in the reign of Richard I. In 1198 the incumbent of a church office was called upon
to show quo warranto-literally, by what warrant-he held the office. J. HIGH, EX-
TRAORDINARY LEGAL REGAL REMEDIES 425 (2d ed. 1874) [hereinafter cited as HIGH].
4. For franchises are special privileges conferred by government upon in-
dividuals, and which do not belong to the citizens of the country, generally,
of common right. It is essential to the character of a franchise that it
should be a grant from the sovereign authority, and in this country no fran-
chise can be held which is not derived from the law of the State.
Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 595 (1839) (Taney, C.J.).
5. 37 YALE L.J. 237, 238 (1927).
6. The original writ was purely a civil remedy. In the sixteenth century, how-
ever, it fell into gradual disuse because of the cumbersome nature of the old real ac-
tion and the conclusiveness of the judgment even against the king. The writ was
slowly replaced by an information in the nature of quo warranto. This information,
although similarly addressing usurpation of franchises and offices granted by the
crown, initially was a criminal proceeding. The usurper was subject to a fine and
possible imprisonment upon conviction and was stripped of the franchise he had
usurped. This distinction soon ceased, however. While the information remained a
criminal proceeding in form, it came to be regarded as a purely civil remedy, the
imposition of a fine being nominal, and for all practical purposes was indistinguish-
able from the common-law writ. Commonwealth ex rel. Schermer v. Franek, 311
Pa. 341, 344, 166 A. 878, 879 (1933); Commonwealth v. Burrell, 7 Pa. 34, 35
(1847); HIGH, supra note 3, at 435; 37 YALE L.J. 237, 238 (1927).
7. HIGH, supra note 3, at 433.
8. 9 Anne, c. 20 (1711).
9. State v. Ashley, 1 Ark. 279, 305 (1839).
10. HIGH, supra note 3, at 434.
11. 74 C.J.S. Quo Warranto § 1 (1951).
states it still exists as part of the common law.12 In Pennsylvania the
Act of 1836's authorizes issuance of writs of quo warranto in five
situations: 14 first, a writ may issue when a person usurps or unlawful-
ly holds any state, county, or township office; second, when a duly
elected or appointed official by his conduct forfeits his office; third,
when a corporate office is usurped or unlawfully held; fourth, when
an association of persons acts as a corporation without lawful authori-
ty; and fifth, when a corporation forfeits its rights, privileges, or
franchises by misuser or nonuser. 5 Simply stated, the Act authorizes
ouster in cases of usurpation of authority not lawfully granted and
forfeiture in cases of misuse of lawful authority. Writs of quo
warranto may be issued upon the suggestion of the attorney general, a
district attorney, or "any person or persons desiring to prosecute the
same."
16
The phrase "any person or persons desiring to prosecute the
same" raises the problem of standing to sue. The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania has construed this phrase to mean "any person having
an individual interest to be affected,"'17 holding that the Act did "not
give a private relator the writ in a case of public right, involving no
individual grievance."' 8  When a public grievance is to be redressed,
"either the Attorney General or the district attorney is the proper
relator."'" An action brought by a private relator having no individ-
ual interest will be dismissed for want of standing. 20 This distinction
between public and private wrongs reflects the writ's origins as a
prerogative remedy available only to the King's attorney general.
Recent cases, however, suggest that this distinction is disappearing.2
12. Delaware, for example, has no statutory provision governing quo warranto.
An information in the nature of quo warranto is available as part of the common
law, but unlike most states, Delaware does not allow the action on the relation of
a private citizen, the Statute of Anne not having been adopted as part of the common
law. Cleaver v. Roberts, 57 Del. 538, 203 A.2d 63 (1964).
13. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 2021-43 (1967), suspended in part by PA. R.
Crv. P. 1458(1)-(3).
14. The object of the statute was "to combine in it all that was valuable in
the ancient writ, with all that was convenient and proper in the quo warranto infor-
mation." Commonwealth v. Jones, 12 Pa. 365, 369 (1849).
15. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2022 (1967), suspended by PA. R. Civ. P. 1458
(1) except insofar as it authorizes actions of quo warranto.
16. Id.
17. Commonwealth ex rel. Gast v. Pfromm, 255 Pa. 485, 490, 100 A. 276, 277-
78 (1917); cases cited note 99 infra.
18. Commonwealth ex rel. McLaughlin v. Cluley, 56 Pa. 270, 272 (1867) (em-
phasis supplied).
19. Commonwealth ex rel. Gast v. Pfromm, 255 Pa. 485, 100 A. 276 (1917);
Gilroy v. Commonwealth ex rel. District Attorney, 105 Pa. 484 (1884).
20. E.g., Dorris v. Lloyd, 375 Pa. 481, 100 A.2d 599 (1953); Thirteenth & Fif-
teenth Sts. Pass'r Ry. v. Broad St. Transit Co., 219 Pa. 10, 67 A. 901 (1907); Com-
monwealth ex rel. McLaughlin v. Cluley, 56 Pa. 270 (1867); Kennedy v. Medical
Serv. Ass'n, 39 Pa. D. & C.2d 27 (C.P. Dauph. 1966). See generally Annot., 51
A.L.R.2d 1303 (1957).
21. See notes 114-29 and accompanying text infra.
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A striking similarity exists between the remedy of quo warranto
and the extraordinary remedies of mandamus at law and injunction in
equity.22 Because quo warranto usually is held to be an exclusive
remedy,2 3 however, counsels' mistakes in identifying the remedy
sought 24 can result in dismissals. 5  Factual analysis is all-important
in selection of the proper remedy. For example, when plaintiff
complains of his improper removal from office, either mandamus or
quo warranto may be appropriate, the proper remedy being "largely
dependent on the operative circumstances of the case."26 If the chief
issue is whether plaintiff was wrongfully removed from office, man-
damus is proper. But if analysis reveals that the primary issue is
whether plaintiff or some other person has legal title to the office, quo
warranto, the sole method of testing right to office,27 becomes the
exclusive remedy.2 s
III. Quo Warranto To Try Title to Public Office
A. The Principle of Exclusivity
The most frequent use of the writ of quo warranto is to test a
public official's title or right to office. Historically Pennsylvania
courts have held that quo warranto is the sole and exclusive method
of testing title to public office ;21 title cannot be tested by manda-
mus, °0 injunction,"l "or any other proceeding that is provided by the
common law.
'8 2
22. Commonwealth ex rel. Davis v. Blume, 307 Pa. 406, 161 A. 551 (1932);
HIGH, supra note 3, at 447.
23. Mayer v. Hemphill, 411 Pa. 1, 190 A.2d 444 (1963); 11 STANDARD PENN-
SYLVANIA PRACTICE 333 (rev. ed. 1964).
24. See notes 67-74 and accompanying text infra.
25. E.g., Driskel v. O'Connor, 339 Pa. 556, 15 A.2d 366 (1940); Cella v.
Davidson, 304 Pa. 389, 156 A. 99 (1931); Eddy v. Borough of Ashley, 281 Pa. 4,
125 A. 308 (1924); Commonwealth ex rel. Stahl v. James, 214 Pa. 319, 63 A. 743
(1906); Graeff v. Felix, 200 Pa. 137, 49 A. 758 (1901). But see Commonwealth
ex rel. Specter v. Martin, 426 Pa. 102, 232 A.2d 729 (1967).
26. Gernert v. Lindsay, 2 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 576, 579 (1971).
27. Brinton v. Kerr, 320 Pa. 62, 181 A. 569 (1935).
28. 2 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 576, 580.
29. E.g., United States ex rel. Watkins v. Pennsylvania, 214 F. Supp. 913
(W.D. Pa. 1963); DeFranco v. Belardino, 448 Pa. 234, 292 A.2d 299 (1972); Mc-
Cracken v. Bissett, 415 Pa. 303, 203 A.2d 481 (1964); Mayer v. Hemphill, 411 Pa.
1, 190 A.2d 444 (1963); Carroll Tp. School Bd. Vacancy Case, 407 Pa. 156, 180 A.2d
16 (1962); Dorris v. Lloyd, 375 Pa. 481, 100 A.2d 599 (1953); Brinton v. Kerr,
320 Pa. 62, 181 A. 569 (1935); Commonwealth ex rel. District Attorney v. Gibson,
316 Pa. 429, 175 A. 389 (1934); William's Appeal, 312 Pa. 477, 167 A. 587 (1933);
Commonwealth ex rel. McLaughlin v. Cluley, 56 Pa. 270 (1867).
30. Commonwealth v. James, 214 Pa. 319, 63 A. 743 (1906).
31. Eddy v. Ashley Borough, 281 Pa. 4, 125 A. 308 (1924).
32. Brinton v. Kerr, 320 Pa. 62, 63-64, 181 A. 569, 570 (1935).
Quo warranto is the Gibralter [sic] of stability in government
tenure. Once a person is duly elected or duly appointed to pub-
lic office, the continuity of his services may not be interrupted
and the uniform working of the governmental machinery dis-
organized or disturbed by any proceeding less than a formal
challenge to the office by that action which is now venerable
with age, reinforced by countless precedent, and proved to be
protective of all parties involved in a given controversy, namely,
quo warranto.
33
Quo warranto has been held an exclusive remedy because an
action to oust a public officer "possesses many of the elements of a
criminal prosecution" 34 and is "a matter in which the public is vitally
concerned. ' 5  An action in quo warranto addresses only one issue,
the right to an office. 36 Respondent is compelled to appear and
prove his right to office.37 The principle of exclusivity protects
the officeholder, however, from rulings adverse to his title in suits in
which he is not a party.38 It has been held that making quo warranto
an exclusive remedy available only to the Commonwealth or a person
possessing "some peculiar, personal interest aside from his general
interest as a member of the public"39 limits the possibility of frivolous
suits and irresponsible harassment of officials.40
Only a few exceptions to the rule of exclusivity have been
developed. Courts may inferentially pass on title to office in suits in
which the major issue is some other problem 41 or in which the issue of
right to office is purely incidental.4 2  For example, A, the retiring
county treasurer, violates a court decree ordering him to turn over the
appurtenances of office to his elected successor, B. The violation
33. Carroll Tp. School Bd. Vacancy Case, 407 Pa. 156, 157-58, 180 A.2d 16,
17 (1962).
34. Commonwealth ex rel. Schermer v. Franek, 311 Pa. 341, 344, 166 A. 878,
879 (1933).
35. Brinton v. Kerr, 320 Pa. 62, 64, 181 A. 569, 570 (1935).
36. Meyer v. Strouse, 422 Pa. 136, 221 A.2d 191 (1966).
37. Commonwealth v. Peoples, 40 Pa. D. & C. 689 (C.P. Del. 1941).
38. Commonwealth ex rel. District Attorney v. Gibson, 316 Pa. 429, 433, 175
A. 389, 391 (1934). This case was a mandamus action to compel appointment of
petitioner to a public office. The court conceded the validity of petitioner's position
on the merits, but was unable to grant any relief.
It is well settled that mandamus will not lie to compel the installation of
one person in an office of which there is already a de facto incumbent,
[citations omitted], for to do so would be to try the latter's title to office
in a proceeding to which he is not a party.
Id. at 433, 175 A. at 391.
39. Commonwealth ex rel. Schermer v. Franek, 311 Pa. 341, 345, 166 A. 878,
879 (1933); Commonwealth v. Morris, 269 Pa. 476, 112 A. 770 (1921); Common-
wealth v. Crow, 218 Pa. 234, 67 A. 355 (1907).
40. See Sherman v. Yiddisher Kultur Farband, 375 Pa. 108, 112-13, 99 A.2d
868, 869-70 (1953); Commonwealth v. Meeser, 44 Pa. 341, 342 (1863) (finding a
"vicious abuse of law" to allow quo warranto "at the pleasure of every intermeddler
or malicious person").
41. Bowers v. Reitz, 315 Pa. 310, 314, 172 A. 707, 709 (1934).
42. Moosic Lakes Club v. Gorski, 402 Pa. 640, 646, 168 A.2d 343, 347 (1961);
McKay-Smith v. Philadelphia, 54 Pa. Super. 257 (1913).
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may be adjudicated in contempt proceedings, even though their effect
will be to affirm B's title to office, since A's misconduct, not B's title,
is the major issue.1
3
A second exception is when an election produces two claimants
to a public office. In this situation "the exclusive remedy is by a
contest under the election laws rather than by quo warranto." '44 The
legislature is deemed to have supplanted the general remedy of quo
warranto with the specific statutory procedure.4 5 Aside from election
cases, however, claims that quo warranto has been superseded by
specific statutory remedies have been fruitless. Courts have held that
various statutory provisions were not intended to resolve disputes
concerning the right to hold public office.46
B. Usurpation by De Facto Officers
Quo warranto is the proper remedy to oust de facto officers who
usurp public office and de jure officers who forfeit their office.47 This
distinction is important. A de jure officer possesses complete and
unchallenged title to office. There is no doubt that he is entitled to
the position he occupies.48 He can be removed from office only by
some act of misconduct that strips him of his tenure.4 9 Until then his
status is impregnable.
A de facto officer, on the other hand, has the appearance of a de
jure officer, but not his authority. He must be more than a mere
volunteer to office5" and must be discharging official duties under
43. Bowers v. Reitz, 315 Pa. 310, 172 A. 707 (1934).
44. Commonwealth v. Zug, 43 Pa. D. & C. 402, 405 (C.P. Cumb. 1942); see
Commonwealth v. Leech, 44 Pa. 332, 334 (1863); Commonwealth ex rel. Ross v.
Baxter, 35 Pa. 263 (1860); Commonwealth v. Garrigues, 28 Pa. 9 (1857); Common-
wealth v. Clinger, 24 Del. 504 (Pa. C.P. 1934).
45. Carroll Tp. School Bd. Vacancy Case, 407 Pa. 156, 158, 180 A.2d 16, 17
(1962); see Commonwealth v. Lardin, 18 Pa. Dist. 717 (C.P. Fay. 1908); Bowman's
Case, 18 Pa. Dist. 326 (C.P. Fay. 1908).
46. Carroll Tp. School Bd. Vacancy Case, 407 Pa. 156, 159, 180 A.2d 16, 18
(1962); Commonwealth ex rel. McCreary v. Major, 343 Pa. 355, 363-64, 22 A.2d
686, 690 (1941); Sewickley Tp. School District's Appeal, 327 Pa. 396, 400, 194 A.
488, 489 (1937); William's Appeal, 312 Pa. 477, 479, 167 A. 587, 588 (1933).
47. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2022 (1967); Cleaver v. Commonwealth, 34 Pa.
283 (1859).
48. Commonwealth ex rel. Hunter v. Smail, 238 Pa. 106, 85 A. 1088 (1913);
Cleaver v. Commonwealth, 34 Pa. 283, 284 (1859).
49. United States ex rel. Watkins v. Pennsylvania, 214 F. Supp. 913, 916
(W.D. Pa. 1963); cases cited therein.
50. Smith v. Gallagher, 408 Pa. 551, 626, 185 A.2d 135, 172 (1962) (Bell,
C.J., concurring and dissenting); Pleasant Hills Borough v. Jefferson Tp., 359 Pa.
509, 512, 59 A.2d 697, 699 (1948).
color of some authority, no matter how irregular or informal. 5 Two
important consequences attach to de facto status: (1) the acts of de
facto officers are valid against the public, but void if personal benefit
results;52 and (2) the right of a de facto officer cannot be tested
collaterally, but must be tested directly in an action of quo warran-
to.5
3
A successful quo warranto action ousting a de facto officer does
not operate retroactively. Like an injunction it "is addressed to
preventing a continued exercise of authority unlawfully asserted rath-
er -than to correct what has already been done under that authority."54
The action's prospective nature precludes relief for a person injured
by an act of a de facto officer. 5 Thus, a 1974 Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania decision held that a dentist whose license was suspended
by a state board was unable to bring a quo warranto action challeng-
ing the board's constitutionality because the de facto doctrine made
its acts valid against him.56 This was true even though the attorney
general conceded the merit of plaintiffs constitutional argument. If
the action had been filed before the de facto officers' acts were final,
however, quo warranto would have been upheld.
57
Quo warranto will lie only when respondent has actually
usurped the office by performing official duties.5" It is inapplicable
when a challenged officeholder has resigned or the term of a contest-
ed office has expired since the issue is then moot.59 An actual,
continuing usurpation is essential to the action. This concept of
usurpation is illustrated by McCracken v. Bissett.60 McCracken was
a duly elected school director. The board chairman refused to seat
him, however, and declared a vacancy. McCracken then sued in
equity to compel the chairman to seat him. The supreme court
dismissed the complaint, holding that his remedy was not in equity,
51. Commonwealth ex rel. Palermo v. Pittsburgh, 339 Pa. 173, 13 A.2d 24
(1940); In re Krickbaum's Contested Election, 221 Pa. 521, 70 A. 852 (1908).
52. State Dental Council & Exam. Bd. v. Pollock, 457 Pa. 264, 318 A.2d 910
(1974); Borough of Pleasant Hills v. Jefferson Tp., 359 Pa. 509, 59 A.2d 697
(1948); Commonwealth ex rel. Raker v. Snyder, 294 Pa. 555, 144 A. 748 (1929).
53. Borough of Pleasant Hills v. Jefferson Tp., 359 Pa. 509, 59 A.2d 697
(1948); Commonwealth ex rel. Palermo v. Pittsburgh, 339 Pa. 173, 13 A.2d 24
(1940); Brinton v. Kerr, 320 Pa. 62, 181 A. 569 (1935). But cf. Smith v. Gallagher,
418 Pa. 551, 185 A.2d 135 (1962).
54. State Dental Council & Exam. Bd. v. Pollock, 457 Pa. 264, 269, 318 A.2d
910, 913 (1974). See also Johnson v. Manhattan R.R., 289 U.S. 479 (1933).
55. See Coyle v. Commonwealth, 103 Pa. 117, 130 (1883).
56. State Dental Council & Exam. Bd. v. Pollock, 457 Pa. 264, 318 A.2d 910
(1974).
57. Id. at 279, 318 A.2d at 918 (Manderino, J., dissenting).
58. Updegraff v. Crans, 47 Pa. 103 (1864); Commonwealth v. Zug, 43 Pa. D.
& C. 402 (C.P. Cumb. 1942).
59. Meyer v. Strouse, 422 Pa. 136, 221 A.2d 191 (1966) (term of office had
expired; court refused to determine appellant's right to compensation).




but in mandamus or quo warranto.6 1 If the vacancy had been filled,
the replacement would be usurping the office rightfully belonging to
McCracken and quo warranto would lie. If the vacancy remained
unfilled, however, the absence of a usurper would make mandamus
the appropriate means to compel McCracken's seating.62
A slight variation in the facts can change completely the choice
of remedies. Assume that X has been elected town tax collector and
currently is performing his duties. The town council without ousting
X appoints Y as tax collector. Because X has not yet been ousted, an
action in mandamus to compel his reinstatement will serve no pur-
pose. Because Y has not yet assumed any official duties, there has
been no usurpation and quo warranto is inapposite. Thus, X's
proper remedy is in equity. A court will enjoin the town council
from delivering tax records to Y, thereby preventing both illegal
ouster and' usurpation. 63  In the interim if ouster or usurpation
should occur, mandamus or quo warranto will become appropriate.64
Although factual analysis is essential in choosing the proper
remedy, the necessary distinctions are not always susceptible to pre-
cise demarcation. 5 Pennsylvania courts as well as practitioners have
sometimes gone astray in this area.66 A case in point is Bentman v.
Seventh Ward Democratic Executive Committee.67  In this case the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld a writ of mandamus to com-
pel reinstatement of an ousted officer despite the filling of the vacancy
by an appointed successor. Analytically the case was a quo warranto
action. The dissent lucidly pointed out that
the majority have overlooked one crucial fact-that before the
outsiders can get in, the insiders must be ordered out. And this
• . . no court should ever accomplish by writ of mandamus...
61. Id. at 304, 203 A.2d at 481.
62. If the vacancy had been filled, mandamus also would have been inappropri-
ate for failure to provide the subsequent appointee with his day in court. The only
parties to the mandamus proceeding were McCracken and the board chairman. See
Commonwealth ex rel. District Attorney v. Gibson, 316 Pa. 429, 175 A. 389 (1934).
63. Appeal of Pottsville Borough Town Council, 1 Mona. 705, 15 A. 730
(1888).
64. Eddy v. Ashley Borough, 281 Pa. 4, 125 A. 308 (1924).
65. Driskel v. O'Connor, 339 Pa. 556, 15 A.2d 366 (1940) (main issue was
contested right to exercise school directors' powers; hence equity action was inappro-
priate). But see Hayes v. Sturges, 215 Pa. 605, 64 A. 828 (1906) (court agreed to
hear similar matter in equity upon consent of counsel).
Commonwealth ex rel. Davis v. Blume, 307 Pa. 406, 161 A. 551 (1932), con-
lains the most lucid discussion of the distinction between mandamus and quo war-
ranto. See also Caffrey v. Caffrey, 28 Pa. Super. 22 (1905).
66. Gernert v. Lindsay, 2 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 576, 579 (1971).
67. 421 Pa. 188, 218 A.2d 261 (1966).
It is obvious then that what plaintiffs seek is to test the right
of their successors to the offices.08
Because plaintiff had clear title to his seat, the majority reasoned that
the only issue was the legality of his ouster; his successor's title was
found irrelevant.6" This reasoning is faulty, however, because it
ousted an officeholder by a proceeding to which he was not a party. 70
Nevertheless, Bentman was reaffirmed in 1971 by a commonwealth
court decision7' that suggested the rights of the subsequent office-
holder can be adequately protected by joining him as a party to the
mandamus action.72
An even more recent commonwealth court decision 73 presents a
graphic example of the procedural technicalities that can ensnare
counsel when title to office is at issue. Plaintiffs brought suit in
equity against the Secretary of Education, challenging the lawfulness
of his action in certifying the intervening defendant as a school district
superintendent. All parties agreed that plaintiffs' ultimate objective
was the superintendent's ouster. Defendants contended that -the
proper remedy was not in equity, but at law in quo warranto. The
court held that regardless of plaintiffs' objective their complaint was
directed solely at the Secretary's allegedly improper certification, a
purely ministerial act that could be challenged only in mandamus.
Therefore, the court dismissed the action with leave to amend.
Decisions like this create an unnecessary barrier between citizens
and courts. In the last case all parties necessary for a hearing on the
merits were present. Yet the court's holding forces a repetition of the
whole process, this time under the cognomen of mandamus. More
importantly, even if plaintiffs are successful in their mandamus ac-
tion, that adjudication will not oust the superintendent from office; it
will only declare the Secretary's certification illegal. The ouster will
require yet another action-this one in quo warranto.7 1 Such a de-
cision provides no explanation of when quo warranto lies and when
it does not; it simply exalts form over substance.
There are other illustrations, however, of usurpations that are
not so abstruse. After a person has entered public office, his tenure
68. Id. at 204, 218 A.2d at 270 (Cohen, J., dissenting).
69. Commonwealth ex rel. O'Brien v. Gibbons, 196 Pa. 97, 46 A. 313 (1900).
But see McCracken v. Bissett, 415 Pa. 303, 203 A.2d 481 (1964); Carroll Tp. School
Bd. Vacancy Case, 407 Pa. 156, 180 A.2d 16 (1962).
70. See note 62 supra.
71. Gemert v. Lindsay, 2 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 576 (1971).
72. Id. at 579-83.
73. Flinn v. Pittenger, 19 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 54, 338 A.2d 735 (1975).
74. The Secretary of Education would be defendant in the mandamus action.
Because the school superintendent would not be a party to the action, he could not
be ousted by it. Commonwealth ex rel. District Attorney v. Gibson, 316 Pa. 429,
175 A. 389 (1934).
Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
may be challenged by a claim -that the statute creating his office is
unconstitutional. r5 Because the relief sought is ouster, quo warranto
is the exclusive remedy even though the only issue is the statute's
constitutionality. An adjudication of unconstitutionality will trans-
form the officeholder into a usurper.7 6  If the dispute concerns the
legality of respondent's appointment to office, quo warranto again is
the exclusive remedy because the suit attacks the officeholder's legal
right to serve. 77 Thus, when a city council appointed one of its
members to serve on the Board of Municipal Authority, quo warranto
was the proper method of determining whether the appointment
violated public policy.78 Quo warranto also enforces statutory quali-
fications for appointees. 79 If a city treasurer withholds the salary of a
public official he believes was illegally appointed, the official's reme-
dy is not mandamus to force payment of his salary, but quo warranto
since the issue concerns his right to office.8 0
C. Forfeiture by De Jure Officers
Quo warranto lies to test the title of de jure officers as well as
that of de facto officers."' The de jure officer unquestionably has the
initial right to exercise his duties. The question in quo warranto is
whether he has committed or omitted an act "whereby a forfeiture of
his office shall by law be created."8 2
To allow an ouster the conduct complained of must work a
forfeiture. A public official charged with performing a lawful duty
in an unlawful manner or with exercising a right not lawfully granted
is not subject to quo warranto because these acts are not grounds for
75. Commonwealth ex rel. Kirkpatrick v. Denworth, 145 Pa. 172, 22 A. 820
(1891); Snyder v. Boyd, 26 Dauph. 375 (Pa. C.P. 1923); see Gwinn v. Kane, 19
Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 243, 339 A.2d 838 (1975).
76. Id. See also Commonwealth ex rel. Carson v. Warren, 217 Pa. 163, 66
A. 322 (1907) (statute giving officer unconstitutional powers held not grounds for
ouster).
77. Collins v. Gessler, 452 Pa. 471, 307 A.2d 892 (1973); DeFranco v. Belar-
dino, 448 Pa. 234, 292 A.2d 299 (1972); Commonwealth ex rel. McCreary v. Major,
343 Pa. 355, 22 A.2d 686 (1941); Commonwealth v. Commissioners of Philadelphia,
1 S. & R. 382 (Pa. 1815). See also Commonwealth ex rel. Claghorn v. Cullen, 13
Pa. 133 (1850); Commonwealth ex rel. Watt v. Perkins, 7 Pa. 42 (1847).
78. Commonwealth ex rel. McCreary v. Major, 343 Pa. 355, 22 A.2d 686
(1941).
79. Commonwealth ex rel. Shoemaker v. Thomas, 328 Pa. 19, 22, 195 A. 103,
105 (1937). See also Brinton v. Kerr, 320 Pa. 62, 181 A. 569 (1935).
80. Commonwealth ex rel. Shoemaker v. Thomas, 328 Pa. 19, 195 A. 103
(1937).
81. See note 47 supra.
82. Id.; Commonwealth v. Allen, 70 Pa. 465, 471 (1872).
forfeiture. Since quo warranto "is only employed to test the actual
right to an office or franchise, it follows that it can afford no relief for
official misconduct and cannot be employed to test the legality of the
official action of public officers."" 3  When the misconduct causes a
forfeiture, quo warranto is the exclusive remedy and an injunction
will be denied."' But when a public officer exercises powers not
granted -him or otherwise acts short of a cause for forfeiture, equitable
relief is proper.
8 5
Forfeiture most commonly occurs when a de jure official ac-
quires a second, incompatible office. In the leading case of Com-
monwealth v. Allen86 a city councilman became surety for the city
treasurer in violation of a statute expressly prohibiting this conflict of
interest. Respondent admitted the violation, but argued that the
court could not declare a forfeiture absent a misdemeanor convic-
tion.87 The court disagreed: "Forfeiture arises in the unlawful rela-
tion, not upon the conviction for the misdemeanor."88 The incom-
patibility of offices is governed by the Pennsylvania constitution 9 and
statutes.9" Under early Pennsylvania law, however, a court in quo
warranto could declare offices incompatible solely on public policy. 9'
This practice was terminated by the supreme court's decision in
Commonwealth ex rel. Schermer v. Franek.92 On the other hand, a
court may still find a legislative intent to make certain offices incom-
83. Commonwealth v. Peoples, 40 Pa. D. & C. 689, 693 (C.P. Del. 1941); see
HIGH, supra note 3, at 448. Language to the contrary can be found in Common-
wealth ex rel. Dysart v. McWilliams, 11 Pa. 61 (1849), but was expressly disavowed
in Cleaver v. Commonwealth ex rel. Porter, 34 Pa. 283 (1859).
84. Hagner v. Heyberger, 7 W. & S. 104 (Pa. 1844).
85. Commonwealth ex rel. Lewis v. Becker, 5 Lack. 115 (Pa. C.P. 1904).
When the conduct causing forfeiture is also a criminal offense, a criminal conviction
is not a prerequisite to ouster in quo warranto unless the grounds for forfeiture are
defined by statute to be the conviction itself. Commonwealth v. Peoples, 40 Pa. D.
& C. 689, 696 (C.P. Del. 1941); Kurtz v. Steinhart, 60 Pa. D. & C. 345 (C.P. North.
1947).
86. 70 Pa. 465 (1872).
87. Id. at 471.
88. Id.; Commonwealth ex tel. Crow v. Smith, 343 Pa. 446, 23 A.2d 440
(1942); Commonwealth ex rel. Schermer v. Franek, 311 Pa. 341, 166 A. 878 (1933);
Commonwealth ex rel. Sherwood v. Bennett, 233 Pa. 286, 82 A. 249 (1912). Cf.
Chalfin v. Specter, 426 Pa. 464, 233 A.2d 562 (1967).
89. PA. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
90. The following offices are incompatible: state and federal offices; justice of
the peace and prothonotary; associate judge and justice of the peace; constable and
township or borough auditor; district attorney and any other public office; county
commissioner and member of board of health; prison inspector and alderman or attor-
ney; councilman and guardian of the poor; member of the legislature and council-
man; councilman and any other city or county office; councilman and school director;
member of Congress and state legislature; constable and justice of the peace. PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 65, §§ 1-17 (1969).
91. Commonwealth ex rel. Raker v. Snyder, 294 Pa. 555, 144 A. 748 (1929);
Johnson v. Henna, 68 Pa. Super. 45 (1917).
92. 311 Pa. 341, 166 A. 878 (1933). But cf. In re Stanley, 204 Pa. Super.
29, 201 A.2d 287 (1964) (incompatibility of public and private office).
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patible. 8 Generally the holder of two incompatible offices may
choose the one he wishes to resign. If he declines, the court will
determine the one he must relinquish. 4
D. Standing To Bring Quo Warranto
Pennsylvania cases distinguish wrongful occupations of public
office as public or private wrongs. This distinction, traceable to the
origins of the writ of quo warranto, 95 is firmly rooted in the Act of
1836,96 which authorizes issuance of writs "upon the suggestion of
the attorney general, . . . or of any person or persons desiring to
prosecute the same."'9 7 The most lucid analysis of this phrase is
found in Commonwealth ex rel. Gast v. Pfromm:
When it is suggested that one is usurping a public office, the
Quo Warranto Act of 1836 makes provision for two distinct
proceedings, the first in the interest of the public, and the sec-
ond to protect any private individual who may have a special
grievance. If one, without authority of law, holds a public of-
fice, and thereby keeps out of it another who is entitled thereto,
he not only commits a public, but also a private, wrong, and the
individual aggrieved may have a writ in the name of the Com-
monwealth to secure his rights; but where a public wrong alone
is to be redressed, that is to say, where the only question to de-
termine is whether the person in possession of the office is hold-
ing it without authority of law, either the attorney general or
the district attorney [and no one else] is the proper relator
98
A private relator may not bring an action in quo warranto to redress a
public wrong when he has no individual grievance. 99 The private
relator must possess some peculiar interest in the controversy aside
from his general interest as a citizen. 0 If a judgment of ouster will
93. See Commonwealth ex rel. Storb v. Ressler, 55 Lanc. 231, 235 (Pa. C.P.
1957).
94. Chalfin v. Specter, 426 Pa. 464, 233 A.2d 562 (1967); Commonwealth ex
rel. Crow v. Smith, 343 Pa. 446, 23 A.2d 440 (1942); Commonwealth ex rel. Ryan
v. Haeseler, 161 Pa. 92, 28 A. 1014 (1894).
95. See notes 4-10 and accompanying text supra.
96. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2022 (1967).
97. Id.
98. 255 Pa. 485, 491, 100 A. 276, 278 (1917) (emphasis supplied).
99. Commonwealth ex rel. McLaughlin v. Cluley, 56 Pa. 270 (1867), is the
leading case on the point. E.g., Stroup v. Kapleau, 455 Pa. 171, 313 A.2d 237
(1973); Commonwealth ex rel. Specter v. Martin, 426 Pa. 102, 232 A.2d 729 (1967);
Sherman v. Yiddisher Kultur Farband, 375 Pa. 108, 99 A.2d 868 (1953); Common-
wealth ex rel. Schermer v. Franek, 311 Pa. 341, 166 A. 878 (1933); Commonwealth
ex rel. Butterfield v. McCarter, 98 Pa. 607 (1881); Commonwealth v. Dillon, 84 Pa.
41 (1877).
100. Commonwealth ex rel. Schermer v. Franek, 311 Pa. 341, 166 A. 878
(1933).
not place a private relator in the office, he normally lacks sufficient
standing to maintain the suit.' 0 ' Therefore, a defeated candidate has
no standing to sue his elected rival in quo warranto when ouster will
not place him in office. 10 2  Nor does a county chairman have an
interest distinct from that of the general public to enable him to seek
the ouster of county commissioners guilty of willful violation of the
election laws. The matter is one of public concern and the district
attorney is the proper relator.'013
The harshness of this rule has been softened somewhat by the
recent cases of Stroup v. Kapleau'04 and Gwinn v. Kane.'05  Stroup
held that state senators have sufficient standing to challenge tempo-
rary recess appointments to state office because of their collective
right to confirm or reject certain gubernatorial appointments. Gwinn
allowed a criminal defendant to contest the title of a special prosecu-
tor. Both decisions rested on interests apart from those of the general
public and made no mention of the rule that ouster should place the
relator in office.' 6
These decisions have no effect, however, in the more common
situation exemplified by Commonwealth ex rel. Gast v. Pfromm. 07
Kelly had usurped Gast's seat on the town council and Gast properly
brought an action in quo warranto. °s While in office Kelly cast the
deciding vote to place Pfromm in another vacancy. Gast then
brought a second quo warranto action, this one against Pfromm on
the theory that his tenure was illegal because the deciding vote was
void. The court dismissed the second action since Gast had a person-
al interest only in the office occupied by Kelly. Pfromm's tenure was
"purely a matter of public concern."'0 9
The rule limiting the standing of private citizens to institute
actions in quo warranto is ostensibly reasonable. Its purpose is to
protect public officers from harassment suits brought by private
individuals dissatisfied with officials' performance. 10 The standing
101. Id.
102. Commonwealth ex rel. McLaughlin v. Cluley, 56 Pa. 270 (1870).
103. Dorris v. Lloyd, 375 Pa. 481, 100 A.2d 599 (1953). The underlying as-
sumption in Dorris was that the district attorney, a Republican, would not institute
quo warranto to oust Republican officeholders.
104. 455 Pa. 171, 313 A.2d 237 (1973).
105. 19 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 243, 339 A.2d 838 (1975).
106. See also Commonwealth ex rel. Specter v. Martin, 426 Pa. 102, 123, 232
A.2d 729, 739 (Bell, C.J., dissenting). The Stroup decision, considered in light of
Bentman v. Seventh Ward Demo. Exec. Comm., 421 Pa. 188, 218 A.2d 261 (1966),
suggests that Dorris v. Lloyd, 375 Pa. 481, 100 A.2d 599 (1953), would be decided
differently today.
107. 255 Pa. 485, 100 A. 276 (1917).
108. Commonwealth ex rel. Gast v. Kelly, 255 Pa. 475, 100 A. 272 (1917).
109. 255 Pa. at 489, 100 A. at 277.
110. Commonwealth ex rel. Yard v. Meeser, 44 Pa. 341 (1863); note 40 supra.




rule leaves redress of public wrongs to public authorities and is based
on a confidence in the ability and willingness of the attorney general
and district attorneys to correct these wrongs after notice from private
citizens."' Analogy to a district attorney's duty to enforce criminal
violations is appropriate. 1 2 In both cases the wisdom of instituting
action is a matter of discretion. The attorney general or district
attorney may choose to forego a quo warranto action because the
office is a petty one or because no one complains of being deprived of
the office or because the term of office is short or almost expired. An
underlying problem, however, is the possibility that the district attor-
ney or attorney general may refuse to bring an action because of
political considerations."' The addition of an equitable remedy in
lieu of quo warranto has helped to eliminate this problem.
E. Equity Actions in Lieu of Quo Warranto
Since 1963 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has carved
exceptions to the rules that quo warranto is an exclusive remedy and
that a private relator must have a special interest to maintain an
action. The process began with Mayer v. Hemphill."4  Mayer
brought a taxpayer's suit in equity to restrain city officials from
paying the salary of James Tate, who was both an elected councilman
and the acting mayor of Philadelphia, on the ground of incompatibili-
ty." 5 The case was complicated by unusual circumstances. First, it
officials, there is considerable incentive among certain citizens to allege improper acts
or illegal methods of election and appointment that can only be remedied by ouster.
111. DeFranco v. Belardino, 448 Pa. 234, 292 A.2d 299 (1972); Commonwealth
v. Burrell, 7 Pa. 34 (1847).
112. See Matson v. Margiotti, 371 Pa. 188, 88 A.2d 892 (1952); Margiotti Ap-
peal, 365 Pa. 330, 75 A.2d 465 (1950); Commonwealth ex rel. Minerd v. Margiotti,
325 Pa. 17, 188 A. 524 (1936).
113. An early case, Commonwealth v. Burrell, 7 Pa. 34 (1847), squarely ad-
dressed this issue. In that case the court held that a private citizen without a special
interest could not bring quo warranto. Plaintiff then contended that the attorney
general was required by statute to bring it. This assertion was also held incorrect.
The attorney general was found to be the only party who could bring the action.
Moreover, only he had the discretion to determine if quo warranto was warranted.
Id. at 39. This holding raised the obvious objection that since the Governor had ap-
pointed the attorney general and the officeholder whose right was being challenged,
it was unlikely that the attorney general would bring a quo warranto proceeding
against the latter. The court answered by stating that the attorney general was
deemed to be a person of integrity and that as an officer of the Commonwealth he
would exercise his duty with proper discretion. To conclude otherwise the court held,
"We would deprive the attorney general of his official discretion, and compel him
to act against the dictates of his judgment ....... Id. at 40.
114. 411 Pa. 1, 190 A.2d 444 (1963).
115. PHILADELPHIA, PA., HOME RuLE CHARTER § 10-107(5) (1951) provides
involved a prominent public official. Second, a decision on the
merits was important because of an impending mayoralty election.
Third, the case's political nature probably made the attorney general
and district attorney unwilling to bring a quo warranto action.
The lower court dismissed the action, holding that equity had no
jurisdiction since quo warranto furnished the sole and exclusive reme-
dy." On appeal the supreme court agreed to hear the equity suit and
dismissed on the merits." 7  While affirming the general rule that quo
warranto is the sole method for trying title to public office, the court
found that an exception is justified in highly unusual circum-
stances.' The court said in dicta that "[c]ourts are striving to get
away from technicalities in order to promote justice and if the public
interest is to be protected, courts cannot blind themselves to reali-
ties.""19  Two important implications emerged. First, this dictum
casts doubt on the validity of the standing rule by suggesting that the
distinction between public and private wrongs no longer serves a
useful purpose. Second, it indicates that the writ of quo warranto is
laden with technicalities and queries whether their existence serves the
public interest.120
Two 1967 cases, Commonwealth, ex. rel. Specter v. Martin2'
and Chalfin v. Specter,'22 explicitly allowed use of mandamus and
equity in place of quo warranto. The facts presented in each case
were essentially those in Mayer,'23 again involving "highly exception-
al circumstances" that excused the failure to bring the action in quo
warranto. The cases solidified the exceptional circumstances excep-
tion to the exclusivity of quo warranto. They present no guidance,
however, on what circumstances are sufficiently exceptional and sug-
gest only that the determination be made on an ad hoc basis.
In 1972 the supreme court decided DeFranco v. Belardino,24 a
taxpayer's equity action challenging the appointment of respondent as
township supervisor. Although conceding the merits of the taxpay-
that no officer or employee of the city, except for elected officials running for reelec-
tion, shall become a candidate for any public office without first resigning his posi-
tion.
116. 411 Pa. at 4, 190 A.2d at 445.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 8, 190 A.2d at 447.
119. Id.
120. See notes 65-66 and accompanying text supra. The technicalities implicit
in quo warranto are the confusing distinctions the courts have drawn between quo
warranto, mandamus, and equity. These technicalities have lead to many dismissals
on procedural grounds before a decision on the merits could be reached. See notes
22-25 and accompanying text supra.
121. 426 Pa. 102, 232 A.2d 729 (1967).
122. 426 Pa. 464, 233 A.2d 562 (1967).
123. Both cases concerned the legal incompatibility of Arlen Specter's status as
district attorney of Philadelphia and candidate for mayor just prior to the election.
124. 448 Pa. 234, 292 A.2d 299 (1972).
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er's position, the court reluctantly denied relief because quo warranto
was the sole and exclusive remedy absent exceptional circumstances.
The court noted that the record did not indicate that either the district
attorney or the attorney general was unwilling to act. 12 5 DeFranco
was a four-three decision. The dissenters ignored the exceptional
circumstances doctrine and argued that quo warranto had become an
ineffective remedy because of its technicalities. Justice Manderino
wrote,
,For too long a time, the courts of the land have attempted-un-
successfully-to explain when quo warranto lies and when it
does not. No more time should be wasted in the justice system
by citizens, lawyers and judges trying -to determine how many
quos can successfully dance on the needle point of the war-
rantos.1
26
Additionally he argued that "the requirement that a citizen must
challenge a person's right to public office by a quo warranto proceed-
ing requesting the consent of an elected or appointed government
official is an unjust barrier between a citizen and the courts.' 27
This language was persuasive. In League of Women Voters v.
Lower Merion Township Board of Commissioners128 plaintiffs al-
leged that a township commissioner had forfeited his office by mov-
ing his residence outside the ward he represented. They requested
both the attorney general and the district attorney to institute quo
warranto proceedings. Upon denial of their request, plaintiffs sought
and were granted relief in equity. The court held that when a public
wrong is alleged and public authorities fail to act, a private relator has
a remedy in equity.'
29
F. Quo Warranto in the Twentieth Century
Analysis of Mayer v. Hemphill, 1 0 De Franco v. Belardino,13' and
League of Women Voters v. Lower Merion Township Board of
Commissioners132 begins with the realization that the court has cre-
ated two distinct equitable actions in lieu of the remedy by quo war-
125. Id. at 237, 292 A.2d at 301.
126. Id. at 238, 292 A.2d at 301 (dissenting opinion).
127. Id. at 238-39, 292 A.2d at 301.
128. 451 Pa. 26, 301 A.2d 797 (1973).
129. The court accomplished this by reinterpreting the doctrine of exceptional
circumstances stated in DeFranco to mean "there may be exceptions to the limited
remedy of quo warranto." Id. at 29, 301 A.2d at 799.
130. 411 Pa. 1, 190 A.2d 444 (1963).
131. 448 Pa. 234, 292 A.2d 299 (1972).
132. 451 Pa. 26, 301 A.2d 797 (1973).
ranto, the exceptional circumstances doctrine and the equitable rem-
edy in private relators. Initially it is clear that these decisions con-
tain shortcomings. Because the situations in which it will arise are
rare, the exceptional circumstances doctrine is too narrow in scope to
aid many plaintiffs. Furthermore, it leaves unanswered the most im-
portant issue discussed in Mayer and DeFranco, whether the techni-
calities implicit in quo warranto continue to serve the public interest.
The equitable remedy in private relators, although effective when
public authorities refuse to correct public wrongs, has not eliminated
the standing rule in quo warranto actions. State Dental Council &
Examining Board v. Pollock133 and Gwinn v. Kane,"' both post-
Women Voters decisions, measured standing to sue, absent a request
to public authorities, in terms of the personal injury the private re-
lator had suffered. Nevertheless, the equitable remedy allows
harassment suits and thus undermines the standing rule's effective-
ness.
No doubt these are valid criticisms. They can be met, however,
by an examination of the interrelationship between the rules of stand-
ing and exclusivity. One must first consider the advantages of the
Women Voters decision.
The public benefit that arises from allowing private relators to
challenge the legal right of officials to hold public office is substan-
tial. Many private relators will be responsible citizens like the
League of Women Voters with a legitimate interest in the qualifica-
tions of their representatives. No public interest will be served by
denying them access to the courts under the rule of standing. In fact,
district attorneys may be reluctant to launch ouster proceedings
against other public officials, particularly when they are members of
the same political party. Under these circumstances it is quite possi-
ble that a district attorney will prefer that the action be instituted by a
private citizen. Furthermore, the high cost of litigation will cause all
but the most determined private suiters to refrain from initiating
action. 13 5 In any event, the public benefits more than offset the
harm of a few harassment suits.
This rationale depends on an understanding of the principal
effect of Women Voters: private relators can now challenge the title
of a public officeholder without meeting the traditional standing
requirements. The only prerequisite is that the attorney general and
133. 457 Pa. 264, 318 A.2d 910 (1974).
134. 19 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 243, 339 A.2d 838 (1975).
135. For example, in State Dental Council & Exam Bd. v. Pollock, 457 Pa. 264,
318 A.2d 910 (1974), appellant dropped his action when the court concluded that
the de facto doctrine precluded him from any relief, although he could have obtained




district attorney refuse to bring an action. The court will then
consider the merits of the private relator's claim.
A solid basis no longer exists for continuing the rule of standing
in quo warranto actions. Private relators can circumvent it easily.
The standing rule, despite decisions that continue to discuss it, has
been discredited. The rule of exclusivity was mandated as long as the
standing rule prevailed. It provided the necessary conceptual frame-
work by distinguishing between public and private wrongs. If the
courts had deviated from the exclusivity rule and had allowed private
relators without a special interest to sue in equity, the then valid
standing restrictions would have been unenforceable. With the de-
mise of the standing rule in Women Voters, however, courts should
be more willing to question the need for strict procedural forms of
pleading in actions to test title to public office. The clear implication
of Women Voters is that any rationale that once existed for trying title
exclusively in actions of quo warranto is now of more interest to legal
historians than active practitioners.
The exceptional circumstances doctrine enunciated in Mayer
and DeFranco does not constitute an adequate response to this new
situation. The doctrine does not state when procedural technicalities
will be ignored, but merely demonstrates that courts will ignore them
when they want to reach a decision on the merits. The confusing
distinctions between quo warranto, mandamus, and equity that spring
from the principle of exclusivity are no longer needed. Henceforth
quo warranto should serve only as an indication that title to office is
being contested. Cases that force plaintiff to relitigate because he has
mislabeled his action should be overruled. 3 ' If plaintiff has alleged
facts that demonstrate a need for a hearing on the merits, the court
should proceed to the merits regardless of the form of pleading.
IV. Quo Warranto in the Corporate Realm
A. Ouster of Corporate Officers
The Act of 1836 authorizes the writ of quo warranto in cases
136. Technicalities that serve to bar litigants from a hearing on the merits vio-
late at least the spirit of the Pennsylvania constitution. "All courts shall be open;
and every man for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall
have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale,
denial or delay." PA. CONST. art. I, § 11. See also Willcox v. Penn Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 357 Pa. 581, 600-01, 55 A.2d 521, 530-31 (1947).
contesting title to corporate offices.'8 7  This extension of the reme-
dy 3 ' is based on the premise that usurpation of a corporate office
sufficiently concerns the public to warrant the extraordinary relief
provided by quo warranto.8 9 The writ applies to officers of any
corporation, whether organized for profit or for charitable, religious,
or social purposes. 140 It is available only against officers in the
strictest sense, however, and not against agents and employees.
141
Typically, a corporate action in quo warranto examines the
legality of an election or appointment to discover usurpation of
office.' 42 Although quo warranto can be directed against an entire
board of directors, the effect of the writ is limited to a judgment of
ouster. It neither declares an election of directors void nor orders a
second election held. 43 As with public office, when title to corpo-
rate office is at issue, it can be resolved only by an action in quo
warranto'4 unless title is incidental to the main issues of the
case. 45 Equity does not have jurisdiction over a completed corporate
election even if it is alleged to have been a fraudulent one.' 46  Quo
warranto furnishes a full remedy. An upcoming election about
which "a reasonable apprehension of disorder or fraud" exists, how-
ever, can be enjoined.
4 7
Forfeiture of corporate office by misconduct, although theoreti-
cally within the scope of quo warranto, is practically not part of the
remedy. 48  Statutory provisions authorizing removal of corporate
137. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2022 (1967).
138. The original writ at common law did not extend to corporate officers.
Commonwealth v. Burrell, 7 Pa. 34 (1847).
139. 5 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS 1074 (rev. ed. 1967).
140. Commonwealth v. Morris, 269 Pa. 476, 112 A. 770 (1921) (officer of fra-
ternal society); McDowell v. Wilson, 252 Pa. 91, 97 A. 100 (1916); Dayton v.
Carter, 206 Pa. 491, 56 A. 30 (1903); Commonwealth ex rel. Gordon v. Graham,
64 Pa. 339 (1870) (church trustees).
141. Phillips v. Commonwealth, 98 Pa. 394 (1881).
142. Cases cited note 144 infra.
143. Commonwealth v. Straus, 32 Pa. Super. 389 (1907).
144. E.g., Helsel v. Rodgers, 440 Pa. 516, 269 A.2d 917 (1970); Coleman v.
Huffman, 348 Pa. 580, 36 A.2d 724 (1944); Hanna v. Chester Times, 310 Pa. 583,
166 A. 243 (1933); Celia v. Davidson, 304 Pa. 389, 156 A. 99 (1931); Deal v.
Miller, 245 Pa. 1, 90 A. 1070 (1914); Commonwealth ex rel. Eilenberger v. Yetter,
190 Pa. 488, 43 A. 226 (1899); Jenkins v. Baxter, 160 Pa. 199, 28 A. 682 (1894);
Commonwealth v. Straus, 32 Pa. Super. 389 (1907); Curwood v. Curwood, 38 Pa.
D. & C.2d 571 (C.P. Luz. 1964).
145. Moosic Lakes Club v. Gorski, 402 Pa. 640, 168 A.2d 343 (1961); Sirano-
vich v. Butkovich, 359 Pa. 134, 58 A.2d 461 (1948).
146. Deal v. Miller, 245 Pa. 1, 90 A. 1070 (1914).
147. Id.; Jenkins v. Baxter, 160 Pa. 199, 28 A. 682 (1894); Tunis v. Hestonville,
Mantua & Fairmount Pass'r R.R., 149 Pa. 70, 24 A. 88 (1892).
148. Cf. Whyte v. Faust, 281 Pa. 444, 127 A. 234 (1924). But when a corpora-
tion has removed an officer for misconduct and he refuses to surrender his office,
quo warranto may be used to confirm the legality of the corporation's actions. Com-
monwealth ex rel. Lackovic v. Jankovic, 216 Pa. 615, 65 A. 1099 (1907).
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directors for gross abuse of authority 49 have been construed to create
an equitable remedy.15
The standing of corporate members and stockholders to sue is
unclear. An early decision held that stockholders have sufficient
interest in the title of corporate officers to maintain suit in quo
warranto. 151 In fraternal organization, however, mere membership
has been held insufficient. The relator must have some personal
claim to the office to maintain quo warranto proceedings.' 52 On the
other hand, a later common pleas decision suggested that all members
in good standing of an association or corporation may institute the
action.
153
B. Forfeiture of the Corporate Charter
1. Guideposts.-Quo warranto is the statutorily authorized
remedy' when a corporation allegedly has forfeited its charter
through "misuser or nonuser" or through ultra vires acts.' 55 It also is
the sole method to challenge a de facto corporate existence arising
from defective or irregular organization. Because the remedy has
been used infrequently in Pennsylvania'5 6 the circumstances under
which a corporate charter will be revoked are not easily defined.
Early cases spoke of a contract between the corporation and the
149. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1405 (Supp. 1975).
150. Markowitz v. Markowitz, 336 Pa. 145, 8 A.2d 46 (1939). On the other
hand, one authority has suggested that these proceedings should be in quo warranto.
11 STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE 342 (Rev. ed. 1964).
151. Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 200 Pa. 509, 50 A. 91 (1901); see Common-
wealth v. Stevens, 168 Pa. 582, 32 A. 111 (1895).
152. Commonwealth ex rel. Noel v. Morris, 261 Pa. 476, 112 A. 770 (1921).
153. Pogozelsky v. Melusky, 50 Schuyl. 30 (Pa. C.P. 1954).
154. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 2022-23 (1967).
155. Id. Quo warranto to challenge an improper incorporation is perhaps the
most characteristic use of the remedy. It is extremely rare, however. See Hilliard
v. Allegheny Geom. Wood Carving Co., 173 Pa. 1, 34 A. 231 (1896) (10% of capi-
tal stock not paid as required); Commonwealth ex rel. Baldridge v. Order of Brother-
ly Love, 14 Pa. D. & C. 655 (C.P. Dauph. 1927) (foreign corporation failed to regis-
ter with Commonwealth). Cf. Andel v. Duquesne St. Ry., 219 Pa. 635, 69 A. 278
(1908).
When the charter is alleged to have been obtained by fraudulent representations,
quo warranto is proper although one case suggested that the charter is void ab initio
and may be revoked by the court on its own motion. Commonwealth ex rel. Truscott
v. Yiddisher Kultur Farband, 382 Pa. 553, 116 A.2d 555 (1955); Sherman v. Yid-
disher Kultur Farband, 375 Pa. 117, 99 A.2d 868 (1953). But see In re National
Indem. and Endow. Co., 142 Pa. 450, 21 A. 879 (1891) (void ab initio).
156. Commonwealth ex rel. Truscott v. Yiddisher Kultur Farband, 382 Pa. 553,
116 A.2d 555 (1955), is the most recent case brought to remedy a public wrong (cor-
poration dissolved as a Communist front).
state.157 The Commonwealth was said to receive consideration for its
grant of a charter in that
the objects for which a corporation is created are universally
such as the government wishes to promote. They are deemed
beneficial to the country, and this benefit constitutes the con-
sideration, and in most cases the sole consideration for the
grant. 15
8
The contractual theory allowed a breach by the corporation to result
in a public harm that, in turn, justified the use of the court's extraor-
dinary power to declare a corporate franchise forfeit. 15 9
Since a breach is a public wrong, the quo warranto remedy lies
exclusively with the attorney general. 6 ' Consequently in a suit to
compel payment of certain stock subscriptions, plaintiff could not
seek a forfeiture of defendant's charter on grounds of fraud without
157. It may be affirmed as a general principle, that where there has been
a misuser, or a nonuser, in regard to matters which are of the essence of
the contract between the corporation and the state, and the acts or omis-
sions complained of have been repeated and willful, they constitute a just
ground for forfeiture.
Commonwealth v. Commercial Bank, 28 Pa. 383, 389 (1857), quoted approvingly
in Commonwealth v. Seventh Day Baptists, 317 Pa. 358, 176 A. 17 (1935). See
also Mumma v. Potomac Co., 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 281, 287 (1834); Terrett v. Taylor,
13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43, 51 (1809).
158. Chincleclamouche Lumber & Boom Co. v. Commonwealth, 100 Pa. 438,
444 (1881). See also The Binghamton Bridge, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 51 (1865).
159. See Commonwealth v. Neptune Club, 321 Pa. 574, 184 A. 542 (1936);
Commonwealth ex rel. Woods v. United States Annuity Soc'y, 303 Pa. 19, 154 A.
24 (1931); Commonwealth v. American Baseball Club, 290 Pa. 136, 138 A. 497
(1927); Murphy v. Farmer's Bank, 20 Pa. 415 (1852); Kishacoquillas Tnpke. Rd.
Co. v. McConaby, 16 S. & R. 140 (Pa. 1827).
160. E.g., Commonwealth v. American Baseball Club, 290 Pa. 136, 138 A. 497
(1927); Andel v. Duquesne St. Ry., 219 Pa. 635, 69 A. 278 (1908); Commonwealth
v. McCarter, 98 Pa. 607 (1881); Commonwealth v. Allegheny Bridge Co., 20 Pa.
185 (1852).
Conceivably a private relator could sue a corporation in quo warranto. See
Hughes v. Schwartz, 389 Pa. 103, 132 A.2d 681 (1957). There are very few cases,
however, indicating what might constitute a private wrong that would give a citizen
the requisite standing. See Hughes v. Schwartz, supra (diversion of nonprofit corpo-
ration's assets that directly affects members' pecuniary interests is a private wrong);
Sherman v. Yiddisher Kultur Farband, 375 Pa. 108, 99 A.2d 868 (1953) (attorney
as officer of the court has no standing in quo warranto against corporation that ob-
tained its charter by fraud); Kennedy v. Medical Serv. Ass'n, 39 Pa. D. & C.2d 27
(C.P. Dauph. 1966) (dicta that unjust discrimination against podiatrists by Blue
Shield might enable them to sue in quo warranto to modify charter).
A statutory remedy grants individuals and corporations an equitable right to in-
quire whether or not a corporation is exceeding its charter powers and thereby in-
fringing upon an interest of plaintiff that is distinct from that of the public. PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 117 (1971). The suitor must demonstrate to the court that
the ultra vires acts constitute a direct, rather than a consequential invasion of his
rights, after which relief by injunction or damages may be appropriate. The act,
however, does not authorize declaration of a forfeiture. Gingrich v. Blue Ridge
Mem. Gardens, 444 Pa. 420, 282 A.2d 315 (1971); Blankenberg v. P.R.T. Co., 228
Pa. 338, 77 A. 506 (1910); Thirteenth & Fifteenth Sts. Pass'r Ry. v. Broad St. Rapid
Transit Co., 13 Pa. Dist. 808 (C.P. Phila. 1902). Because this remedy, unlike quo
warranto, includes the possibility of monetary damages, there is little reason for an
injured citizen to sue a corporation in quo warranto.
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the attorney general being a party. The wisdom of this limitation is
clear. Forfeiture in the instant case would have resulted in substan-
tial loss to a large number of shareholders. A forfeiture, although
justified on the facts, would have produced a public harm, rather than
eliminated one. Thus, "the state [could] waive the right to exact the
forfeiture"''11 and choose not to bring quo warranto. 162
Moreover, even if the attorney general decides to bring the
action, relief is in the court's discretion. 1 3 "Courts should act with
extreme caution in proceedings which have for their object the forfei-
ture of corporate franchises."' 64 On the other hand, some authorities
stress that quo warranto is statutory and should "be construed and
administered as to advance, that is, to render effective, the reme-
dy."'65 Within these parameters, then, courts must determine wheth-
er a forfeiture is justified, a decision usually based on the meaning of
public harm.
2. Nonuser.-There are few cases in which corporate charters
have been forfeited for nonuse or abandonment of corporate pow-
ers. 166  They are illustrative, however, of the proposition that it is not
the length of the abandonment, but rather its effect that is decisive. In
one case a corporation was granted a charter to erect dams and booms
on a major river and for fifteen years made no attempt to exercise this
power. In granting the Commonwealth's forfeiture suit the court
161. Kishacoquillas Tnpke. Rd. Co. v. McConaby, 16 S. & R. 140, 144 (Pa.
1827).
162. See Commonwealth v. Dillon, 81 Pa. 41 (1870) (when attorney general
discontinues quo warranto action, private party cannot substitute himself as relator).
163. In re Kearney, 136 Pa. 78, 7 A.2d 159 (1939); Commonwealth ex rel.
Miller v. Sommer, 309 Pa. 447, 164 A. 515 (1933); Commonwealth ex rel. McLaugh-
lin v. Cluley, 56 Pa. 270 (1867); Commonwealth v. Jones, 12 Pa. 365 (1850). In
former practice the issuance of the writ compelling respondent to appear was itself
discretionary. The writ now issues as a matter of right and, thus, the exact holding
of these cases is no longer law. The change is merely procedural, however, the exer-
cise of the court's discretion being postponed to final judgment on the merits. These
cases are still applicable to that determination. See 3 R. ANDERSON, PENNSYLVANIA
CIVIL PRAC'ICE 496 n.3 (1963).
164. E.g., Commonwealth v. American Baseball Club, 290 Pa. 136, 146, 138 A.
497, 501 (1927); Commonwealth v. Monongahela Bridge Co., 216 Pa. 108, 64 A.
909 (1907).
165. Commonwealth v. American Baseball Club, 290 Pa. 136, 146, 138 A. 497,
501 (1927). Commonwealth v. Stevens, 168 Pa. 582, 32 A. 111 (1895); Common-
wealth v. Dillon, 61 Pa. 488 (1869).
166. Commonwealth v. Neptune Club, 321 Pa. 574, 184 A. 542 (1936); Com-
monwealth ex rel. Schnader v. Seventh Day Baptists, 317 Pa. 358, 176 A. 17 (1935);
Commonwealth v. Sturtevant, 182 Pa. 323, 27 A. 916 (1897); Chincleclamouche
Lumber & Boom Co. v. Commonwealth, 100 Pa. 438 (1882). Cf. Erie & N.E. Ry.
v. Casey, 26 Pa. 287 (1856).
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found an implied promise of the corporation to perform the duties
and exercise the powers conferred by its charter. Although not
emphasized in the opinion the "great public injury" element may have
been more determinative of the result: activation of the corporation's
business would have hindered the logging trade on the river.'1 7
This assertion is strengthened by a later case in which the court
refused to declare forfeit a charter unused for twenty-six years be-
cause of the corporation's lack of presumed intent to abandon its
franchises. The court found that no public harm resulted from the
nonuser and intimated that a forfeiture would be declared only in the
presence of strong public policy considerations. 168  One court did
find these considerations present when a charitable corporation's
nonuser amounted to a waste of lands held in public trust., 69
3. Misuser.-The misuser of corporate powers can be grounds
for either revocation of the charter or an order ousting the corpora-
tion from the abused power. In the latter case the corporation retains
its charter. 170  The question of what constitutes misuser is fundamen-
tal. The best definition is "any positive act in violation of the charter,
and in derogation of public right, wilfully done or caused to be done
by those appointed to manage the general concerns of the corpora-
tion.' 171 A private injury does not justify the use of quo warranto;
172
the misconduct must infringe upon a right reserved by the state for
the benefit of the public. 7 3  Furthermore, the misuser cannot be
involuntary, accidental, or the consequence of mistake; it must be
intended. 174  Finally, a transgression by a corporate officer win not
suffice. The misconduct generally must have been authorized by the
board of directors. 5
Forfeiture for misuser may result from one of two fact situations.
In the first, the corporation exercises powers clearly outside the
express or implied powers granted by its charter. For example, a
corporation incorporated solely as a fraternal organization engages in
167. Chincleclamouche Lumber & Boom Co. v. Commonwealth, 100 Pa. 438,
442 (1882).
168. Commonwealth v. Neptune Club, 321 Pa. 574, 184 A. 542 (1936).
169. Commonwealth ex rel. Schnader v. Seventh Day Baptists, 317 Pa. 358, 176
A. 17 (1935).
170. See notes 184-86 and accompanying text infra; Commonwealth v. Delaware
& Hudson Canal Co., 43 Pa. 295 (1862).
171. Erie & N.E. Ry. v. Casey, 26 Pa. 287, 318 (1856). See Commonwealth
ex rel. Woods v. United States Annuity Soc'y, 303 Pa. 19, 21, 154 A. 24, 25 (1931).
172. Quo warranto will not lie when the relator has a private remedy like an
action for damages. Commonwealth v. Allegheny Bridge Co., 20 Pa. 185 (1853);
Commonwealth v. Murray, 11 S. & R. 73 (Pa. 1824) (ejectment); see note 160 supra.






selling insurance. This ultra vires conduct will justify forfeiture.
176
In the second situation, lawfully granted powers are exercised in an
illegal manner that creates a public injury. As an illustration, a
utility charged with supplying water to the public repeatedly supplies
polluted water. This failure to fulfill corporate duties is sufficient
reason to revoke its charter.
17
Whether a judgment in quo warranto will result in charter
forfeiture or merely a decree ousting the corporation of a franchise
not lawfully granted will depend on the severity of the misuse. If a
corporation indicates a "total disregard of charter powers and public
safety, . . . the only proper course is dissolution. 1 78  To justify
such action, however, "the abuse must be clear and the necessity for
such a harsh remedy must be apparent."'1 79 Thus, when a newspaper
gives away insurance policies as a subscription gimmick, it may
properly be ousted from that particular franchise. Forfeiture, on the
other hand, would be inappropriate since the misuser in no way
indicates a failure of the corporate purpose.' Additionally, the
misconduct complained of may be remedied by judicial relief short of
forfeiture through actions other than quo warranto. If the miscon-
duct is criminal, for example, the Commonwealth may choose to
institute criminal proceedings against the officers. Similarly, if the
harm arises from abuse of a special privilege, such as a liquor license,
the license may be revoked by an administrative tribunal. The choice
176. Commonwealth ex rel. Woods v. United States Annuity Soc'y, 303 Pa. 19,
154 A. 24 (1931); see Commonwealth v. Banks, 198 Pa. 397, 48 A. 277 (1901)
(trade school advertising as a university); Commonwealth v. Northeastern Elev. Ry.,
161 Pa. 409, 29 A. 112 (1894) (unauthorized rail extensions); Commonwealth v.
Philadelphia Inquirer, 3 Pa. Dist. 42 (C.P. Dauph. 1892) (unauthorized sale of in-
surance).
177. Commonwealth v. Potter County Water Co., 212 Pa. 463, 61 A. 1099
(1905); see Commonwealth ex rel. Schnader v. Seventh Day Baptists, 317 Pa. 358,
176 A. 17 (1935) (mismanagement of trust property); Commonwealth v. American
Baseball Club, 290 Pa. 136, 138 A. 497 (1927) (violation of blue law); Common-
wealth v. Sturtevant, 182 Pa. 323, 37 A. 916 (1897) (continuous failure to provide
ferry service); Commonwealth v. Sesqui-Centennial Exhib. Ass'n, 8 Pa. D. & C. 77
(1926) (violation of blue law).
178. Commonwealth ex rel. Woods v. United States Annuity Soc'y, 303 Pa. 19,
21, 154 A. 24, 25 (1931).
179. Id. "The law is loath to declare a forfeiture of a valuable corporate fran-
chise. To warrant such action the cause must be clear and the necessity for such a
harsh remedy must be apparent." Commonwealth v. Neptune Club, 321 Pa. 574,
576, 184 A. 542, 543 (1936).
180. Commonwealth v. Philadelphia Inquirer, 3 Pa. Dist. 742 (C.P. Dauph.
1892).
of remedy is discretionary with the attorney general.""1
Therefore, the general rule that "a corporation may be ousted
from the exercise of powers not granted and powers forbidden to be
exercised"'8 2 is of little practical value to counsel in determining
when quo warranto is appropriate. Far more important is the princi-
ple that the court "should consider the justice and propriety of the
proceeding"'" 3 in the exercise of its discretion. The crucial question
regards the seriousness of the misuser. Courts will be inclined to
grant relief in cases involving a fraud on the public.' When the
misuser violates a criminal statute, a court may sustain quo warranto
proceedings even though the conduct complained of is well within
legitimate corporate powers. In fact, the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania has ousted a professional baseball team from playing Sunday
games in violation of a blue law enacted in 1794.185 The determina-
tive question is apparently whether the court believes the criminal
penalty to be an adequate deterrent.' 8 , On the other hand, when the
Commonwealth alleged a conspiracy among street railway companies
to defraud the investing public and to extract excessive fares from
their passengers, the court allowed respondent-corporations to assert
the defense of laches.18 7  The court found that the interests of the
innocent investors who would be damaged by the forfeitures preclud-
ed the Commonwealth's assertion, when for thirty-five years the
validity of the corporate transactions had gone unchallenged.188
C. Evaluation of the Remedy
The scope of quo warranto in the corporate realm is potentially
broad. Conceivably every corporation is subject to charter forfeiture
181. Commonwealth v. United Repub. Club, 33 Del. 200 (Pa. C.P. 1944).
182. Commonwealth v. American Baseball Club, 290 Pa. 136, 138 A. 497
(1927).
183. Commonwealth ex rel. Margiotti v. Union Traction Co., 327 Pa. 497, 508,
194 A. 661, 667 (1937) (emphasis omitted); see Commonwealth ex rel. Miller v.
Sommer, 309 Pa. 447, 164 A. 515 (1932); Gilroy v. Commonwealth, 105 Pa. 84
(1884); Commonwealth v. Jones, 12 Pa. 365 (1849).
184. See Commonwealth ex rel. Truscott v. Yiddisher Kultur Farband, 382 Pa.
553, 116 A.2d 555 (1955) (corporation organized to promote Jewish culture in real-
ity was Communist front); Commonwealth v. Banks, 198 Pa. 397, 48 A. 277 (1901)
(trade school advertising as a university).
185. Commonwealth v. American Baseball Club, 290 Pa. 136, 138 A. 497
(1927); see Commonwealth v. Sesqui-Centennial Exhib. Ass'n, 8 Pa. D. & C. 77
(C.P. Dauph. 1926).
186. The penalty was only $4. Id.
187. Commonwealth ex rel. Margiotti v. Union Traction Co., 327 Pa. 497, 194
A. 661 (1937).
188. See Commonwealth ex rel. Attorney General v. Bala & Bryn Mawr Tnpke.
Co., 153 Pa. 47, 25 A. 1105 (1893) (5-year delay allowed successful defense of




for violations of the law by its officers.'" 9 One commentator has
even suggested that quo warranto could be used to enforce a corpo-
rate duty not to pollute the environment. 190 The lack of recent cases,
however, indicates that this remedy is undesirable. Indeed, it is
doubtful that a Pennsylvania court would countenance broad applica-
tion of quo warranto against a modem corporation. The increased
ability of federal and state governments to regulate corporate affairs is
one reason for the demise of the action. When corporate practices
are deemed socially undesirable, governments do not hesitate to cre-
ate regulatory agencies and statutory penalties specifically de-
signed to remedy the perceived wrongs. Because forfeiture is such an
extreme penalty and because the standards for its use in quo warranto
are so general, modem statutes are much more appropriate for pro-
tecting the public from corporate abuses.
It is submitted, therefore, that courts should defer all quo war-
ranto actions to specific statutory remedies for the offensive conduct.
In the rare case when quo warranto is appropriate,' courts should
allow the Commonwealth to plead instead in equity. Because the
applicable standards are equitable in nature, this procedure will avoid
the technicalities implicit in quo warranto. Standing problems can be
bypassed by eliminating the private relator. A private citizen's inter-
est in whether a corporation holds its charter illegally is certainly less
than in whether a public official illegally holds office. Thus, the
action should be an equitable one available only to the Common-
wealth.
V. Conclusion
The continued vitality of the remedy in quo warranto is uncer-
tain. Pennsylvania courts have begun to question whether quo war-
ranto continues to serve the public interest. Despite major exceptions
to the rules of exclusivity and standing, however, quo warranto is still
the sole method of trying title to public office.
This comment has attempted to present an analytic framework
that will guide counsel in ascertaining the circumstances under which
quo warranto is appropriate. Although this analysis is less than
189. See Commonwealth v. American Baseball Club, 290 Pa. 136, 147, 138 A.
497, 502 (1927) (Kephart, J., dissenting).
190. Comment, Quo Warranto To Enforce a Corporate Duty Not To Pollute the
Environment, 1 ECOLOGY L.Q. 653 (1971).
191. See note 156 supra.
foolproof because of the confusing distinctions between quo warran-
to, mandamus, and equity, it may help to avoid many procedural
pitfalls.
More importantly, recent cases creating equitable remedies in
lieu of quo warranto have been reviewed and analyzed. This com-
ment suggests that the clear implication of Women Voters is that
whatever rationale previously existed for trying title to public office
exclusively in quo warranto is no longer applicable. The courts
should be willing, therefore, to expand the scope of equitable reme-
dies to eliminate the stringent technicalities of the quo warranto
action. If they do so, it will no longer be necessary to determine how
many quos can successfully dance on the needle points of each
warranto.
PAUL J. DELLASEGA
